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FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF AVIATION
AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE
DAVID E. PREWITT*
I. INTRODUCTIONO VER the past decade a controversy has developed over the
question as to whether there should be a federal common
law pertaining to civil aviation litigation. This controversy has
evolved as a result of the application of the Erie doctrine by federal
courts sitting in aviation diversity cases and related forum shopping
by skillful litigation counsel. Some very recent federal decisions
have generated further controversy in this area of law, particularly
a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the
case of Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.' That decision holds that
there is a federal law of contribution and indemnity based on com-
parative negligence governing mid-air collisions of aircraft within
the United States.
II. ERIE DOCTRINE
In the famous case of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,' the Supreme
Court, in overruling the prior decision of Swift v. Tyson,' ruled
that there is no general federal common law and that a federal court
sitting in a diversity case must apply the state law as declared by the
highest state court. Among the reasons given for that decision was
that to allow otherwise might permit different results on the same
issue when tried in a state court as opposed to a federal court sit-
* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1961; J.D., Duke University, 1968. Attorney-at-
law, Philadelphia, Pa. Member of the Pennsylvania and Florida Bars. Reporter,
ABA Committee on Aviation and Space Law; Insurance, Negligence and Com-
pensation Section.
1 13 Av. Cas. 17,297 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 1974).
2 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
341 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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ting in a diversity case. Thereafter, in Klaxon v. Stentor," the
Supreme Court ruled that a federal court sitting in a diversity case
must follow the choice-of-law rule of the state in which the court
is sitting.
III. FORUM SHOPPING
Initially under the Erie doctrine, choice-of-law was a fairly simple
matter, as the state courts applied the lex loci rule to tort litigation.
In the early 1960's, however, forum shopping came into vogue as
various state courts began to apply the choice-of-law rules com-
monly known as grouping of contacts or interest analysis.'
The initial growth of the new choice-of-law rules and related
forum shopping occurred in New York. In the Babcock6 case, in-
volving an automobile accident in Canada, a guest of the New York
driver of the automobile was permitted to recover against his host
in the New York court despite the existence of a guest statute in
the place where the accident occurred. Later, this New York choice-
of-law rule was extended in the case of Kell v. Henderson' to per-
mit a Canadian guest to recover against a New York host under
New York law for an automobile accident which occurred in New
York.
As the New York choice-of-law rule was applied in automobile
cases, it began to be applied to aircrash cases. In Kilberg v. North-
east Airlines,' a New York passenger died in an aircrash in
Massachusetts, which had a limitation on wrongful death damages.
Suit was brought in a New York court, which allowed the pas-
senger's estate to recover wrongful death damages free of the
Massachusetts limitation. The estate of another passenger who died
in the same aircrash brought a diversity suit against the airline in
a federal court in New York in the case of Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines.! The federal court, applying the Erie doctrine, ruled that
it would follow the New York choice-of-law rule set forth in
4313 U.S. 487 (1941).
'Leflar, Choice Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 267 (1966).
' Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
'26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
69 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
'199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd, 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
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Kilberg and permit recovery of damages for wrongful death free of
the Massachusetts limitation. Later, in Griffith v. United Airlines,"
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted a similar choice-of-law
rule to that of New York and allowed unlimited recovery for a
Pennsylvania passenger involved in an aircrash in Colorado when
Colorado had a limitation on wrongful death damages.
A classic example of forum shopping under the Erie doctrine
occurred in the "Boston Harbor" litigation arising out of a crash of
an airliner within the territorial waters of the State of Massachusetts
on October 4, 1960, killing 62 of the 72 passengers on board the
aircraft. One hundred and fourteen lawsuits were brought in fed-
eral court in Massachusetts, fifty-five lawsuits in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania and several suits in New York state courts. The
key choice-of-law problem in that litigation was the fact that
Massachusetts had a $20,000.00 wrongful death limitation and
Pennsylvania had no such limitation.
The main focus of forum shopping in that litigation was the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and the thrust of efforts in
that jurisdiction was directed at preventing application of the
Massachusetts limitation. As a result of those efforts, four separate
appeals were decided by the Third Circuit and one decision was
rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States. Three of
those decisions were related to the trial judge's attempts to have
the litigation transferred to a district court in Massachusetts.1
The other two appeals in the "Boston Harbor" litigation were in-
volved with the questions as to whether admiralty law applied and
the choice-of-law to be applied to wrongful death claims in ad-
miralty.1" It becomes apparent after reviewing the history of the
10416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
11 In the Third Circuit decision of Barrack v. Van Dusen, 309 F.2d 953 (3d
Cir. 1963), the court overruled the trial judges's granting of a Section 1404(a)
transfer of the Philadelphia cases to the District of Massachusetts on the basis
that the trial judge did not have power to transfer the cases. Certiorari was
granted by the Supreme Court, and in the case of Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964), the Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge, indeed, did have
the power to transfer the cases and remanded to the district court. On remand,
the plaintiffs moved to have the trial judge disqualify himself, and upon his de-
nial of that motion, a mandamus was brought against the judge. The Third
Circuit heard the mandamus action in the case of Rapp v. Van Dusen, 305 F.2d
806 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968), and made a suggestion
that the trial judge step down from the case.
12 In the case of Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.
1963), the Third Circuit held, inter alia, that tort claims arising out of the crash
1974]
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"Boston Harbor" litigation that choice-of-law problems under the
Erie doctrine can become tremendous obstacles to the disposition
of aircrash claims on their merits.
IV. TYDINGS BILL
In order to correct some of the problems which arose out of the
Erie doctrine and its progeny, as applied to the field of aviation
litigation, Senator Tydings (D.-Md.) introduced legislation for a
comprehensive body of federal law governing civil legal relations
and acts arising out of aviation activity." Despite Senator Tydings'
vigorous support of the legislation,"' the matter died in committee
in Congress after Senator Tydings failed to be re-elected. Accord-
ingly, for the present time, it appears that there will be no uniform
body of aviation tort law by legislative enactment.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recently, several federal courts have suggested that there should
be a federal common law of aviation. In Aircrash Disaster Near
Dayton, Ohio," a diversity action had been brought by the per-
sonal representative of a deceased passenger killed in an Ohio
crash involving a TWA jet and a corporate aircraft. That suit was
transferred by the Multi-District Panel to a transferee district.
After the completion of discovery, one of the companion cases was
tried, resulting in a verdict against TWA and in favor of Tann,
the owner of the corporate aircraft. Thereafter Tann filed a mo-
tion for summary judgment in the passenger's case on the basis of
collateral estoppel. The transferee court, in granting Tann's mo-
of land based aircraft on navigable waters within the territorial jurisdiction of a
state are cognizable in admiralty regardless whether the flight had any maritime
connection. Finally, in the case of Scott v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14
(3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968), the Third Circuit, on re-
hearing, held, inter alia, that even though tort claims arising out of an aircrash
on navigable waters were cognizable in admiralty, admiralty could apply its own
choice of law process to find that Pennsylvania law should be applied to the
cases inasmuch as Pennsylvania had the most significant contacts with the cases.
"S. 3305, S. 3306, & S. 4089, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); and S. 961, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See generally Sanders, The Tydings Bill, 36 J. Ant
L. & CoM. 550 (1970).
4 See Tydings, Air Crash Litigation: A Judicial Problem and a Congressional
Solution, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 299 (1968).
1 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
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tion, determined that Ohio law, which required mutuality of estop-
pel, should be disregarded and ruled that there was an existing
body of federal law permitting collateral estoppel without the need
for mutuality. In reaching this decision, the court expressly recog-
nized that the Erie doctrine obliges a federal district court in diver-
sity cases to apply state substantive law defining the rights and
obligations of persons with respect to the state-created cause of
action. The court reasoned, however, that once a judgment is
rendered in accordance with the state's standards, it does not follow
that the preclusion or res judicata effect of the judgment upon
other pending federal actions should be governed by state law. The
Sixth Circuit, in Humphreys v. Tann,"6 reversed the ruling of the
transferee court and remanded the case to the transferor court
for further proceedings. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit deter-
mined that although the transferee court had authority to grant
summary judgment, that court had improperly applied the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel, thus denying the plaintiff due process
of law. In its opinion, the Sixth Circuit expressly recognized the
possibility of the existence of a body of federal law which might
apply to the collateral estoppel issue; however, the court felt that
it was unnecessary to decide whether such a body of federal law
might apply in this instance.
In another recent case in a California district court, the court de-
termined that violation of the Federal Aviation Act and regulations
promulgated thereunder creates a federal cause of action, thus grant-
ing the court federal question jurisdiction. In Gabel v. Hughes Air
Corp.,1 several personal injury actions had been brought as a re-
sult of a collision between a military jet and an airliner. The air-
line, whose principal place of business was in California, moved for
dismissal of the actions for a lack of diversity jurisdiction and on
the basis that there was no federal question jurisdiction. After first
distinguishing the application of the Erie doctrine as applying only
to diversity cases, the court determined that the violation of the
duties set forth in the Federal Aviation Act and its regulations
created a federal right, and thus the court had federal question
16487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
17350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
1974]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
jurisdiction. 8 This decision has been criticized in a recent opinion
by the District Court for the Southern District of New York."
VI. THE KomR DECISION
In the recent decision by the Seventh Circuit in Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc.," the court made a direct challenge to the Erie doc-
trine. That case arose out of mid-air collision on September 9, 1969,
over the airspace of Indiana, between an Allegheny airliner and a
private aircraft piloted by a Mr. Carey and owned by Forth Corpor-
ation (a wholly owned subsidiary of Brookside Corporation). At the
time of the crash, the Allegheny aircraft was receiving and adhering
to air traffic control radar directions from an FAA employee. Sub-
sequent to the accident, wrongful death diversity actions were
commenced on behalf of the estates of the deceased passengers
against Allegheny, Carey's estate, Forth and Brookside, and Fed-
eral Tort Claims actions were brought against the United States.
Also, property damage claims were instituted to recover for the
destruction of the two aircraft. Allegheny and the United States
filed cross-claims and third party claims against Carey, Forth and
Brookside. As the first cases came to trial, the United States and
Allegheny, independently of the other three defendants, arrived at
a formula between them to be utilized in disposing of all of the
cases, and the district court approved the compromise agreement.
Thereafter, the United States and Allegheny proceeded to settle the
last few cases. At a subsequent stage of the proceedings, the dis-
trict court permitted Carey, Forth and Brookside, to file additional
paragraphs to their answers, pleading, among other matters, that
the Allegheny and United States cross-actions failed to state a
claim for relief because no right to indemnity or contribution ex-
isted under Indiana law. On the basis of these pleadings, the court
then granted motions to dismiss on the part of Carey, Forth and
Brookside. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the United States and
Allegheny raised the issue, inter alia, as to whether the district
"The court also held that it had pendant jurisdiction over the airline by its
jurisdiction over the United States.
1"D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 18,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The
court expressly declined to follow the reasoning of the Gabel decision and de-
termined that the violation of the Federal Aviation Act and regulations promul-
gated thereunder did not create a federal cause of action.
" 13 Av. Cas. 17,297 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 1974).
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court erred in dismissing their cross-claims and third party claims
for indemnity and contribution against the other defendants, con-
tending, inter alia, that a federal rule of contribution and indemnity
should govern the action rather than Indiana law. 1
The Seventh Circuit held on that issue in the Kohr case that
there should be a federal law of contribution and indemnity gov-
erning mid-air collisions such as the one involved in the litigation.
Further, the court determined that the federal rule of contribution
and indemnity should be on a comparative negligence basis. Ac-
cordingly, the Seventh Circuit determined that it was error for the
district court to grant the motions of Carey, Forth and Brookside
to dismiss the claims of Allegheny and the United States for in-
demnity and contribution. As a basis for imposing a federal law
of contribution and indemnity, the Seventh Circuit determined that
the predominant interest of the federal government in regulating
the affairs of the nation's airways and the prevailing federal inter-
est in uniform air regulation was superior to the interest of the
state wherein the fortuitous event of the collision occurred. Further,
the court determined that the imposition of a federal rule of con-
tribution and indemnity would serve the purpose of eliminating the
inconsistency of results in similar collision occurrences due to the
application of differing state laws on contribution and indemnity.
In the Kohr opinion the Seventh Circuit failed to deal with the
application of the Erie doctrine even though the jurisdiction of the
cases in the district court was based on diversity of citizenship and
the Federal Tort Claims Act. It is submitted that in order for the
Seventh Circuit to disregard Indiana law and apply a federal law
of contribution and indemnity, the impact of the Erie doctrine on
that decision must somehow be explained or distinguished.
Indeed, in the Dayton Crash case,' the district court recognized
the obvious impact of the Erie doctrine on its decision and attempt-
ed to distinguish that doctrine. Moreover, in the Gabel case," the
California district court recognized the Erie doctrine and distin-
guished its application on the basis that the doctrine applied only
21 On that issue, Allegheny alternatively contended that in view of the number
of state jurisdictions involved, with various plaintiffs instituting actions in states
other than Indiana, the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing
to facilitate the proper choice of law analysis.
'2 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
2a350 F. Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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to diversity cases and not to federal question jurisdiction cases.
In a well-reasoned legal analysis, Professor Keefe has proposed
that a federal body of common law should be applied to civil avia-
tion tort litigation.' He has expressly recognized, however, that
this result cannot be accomplished without the abrogation by the
Supreme Court of the United States of the Erie doctrine as it is
applied to aviation diversity cases."2
The Supreme Court in recent years seemingly has been willing
to review its prior decisions to achieve just results in pending litiga-
tion. Indeed, in the case of Morangne v. States Marine," the
Supreme Court, expressly overruling the case of The Harrisburg,'
determined that there was a right to recover for wrongful death
under general maritime law independent of the Jones Act, 8 the
Death On the High Seas Acte or state law when a death occurred
in state territorial waters.
VII. CONCLUSION
Much can be said in favor of the proposition that there should
be a federal common law pertaining to civil aviation litigation.
Forum shopping under the Erie doctrine over the past decade has
shown that state choice-of-law problems can become tremendous
obstacles to the disposition of aircrash claims on their merits. Inas-
much as it appears that there will be no federal legislation in this
area for the foreseeable future, the resolution of this problem will
be left to the federal courts. However, this result cannot be accom-
plished without the re-consideration by the Supreme Court of the
Erie doctrine as it applies to civil aviation litigation.
"See Keeffe, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and the True Na-
tional Common Law, 18 AM. U.L. REV. 316 (1968), and Keeffe & DeValerio,
Dallas, Dred Scott and Eyrie Erie, 38 J. AIR L. & COM. 107 (1972).
2 Materials cited note 24 supra.
20 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
27 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
2846 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
2946 U.S.C. § 761-67 (1970).
